 Following the early May 2006 decision of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to postpone the test of India’s Agni III intermediate range ballistic missile, India’s top defense scientist declared that India’s missile development team was prepared to test-launch the system, but, he implied, was being held back by the country’s leadership for political reasons. Referring to India’s Defense Research and Development Organization, which is building the Agni III, M. Natarajan, science advisor to the Indian minister of defense, stated, “We (DRDO) are technically ready for the test-firing of the missile. We are awaiting a nod from the government.” [1] The apparent effort to pressure Singh to reconsider the postponement was made at a public ceremony to mark the opening of the new DRDO headquarters, in New Delhi, a ceremony at which the Indian prime minister was the guest of honor. [2]
The Agni III, usually estimated to have a range of 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers, is said to be capable of carrying a powerful nuclear warhead and to be intended to strike targets deep in China. [3] The three-stage system is to be made available in road- or rail-mobile modes and is said to use both liquid and solid-fuel engines. [4]
In announcing the postponement of the missile test, Prime Minister Singh stressed that the significant costs of the launch detracted from his government’s ability to address more pressing priorities. In comments to the Indian parliament, he stated:
I have been concerned about the problems of cost and time overruns which have plagued our defense industry for decades now. For it is true that each project that undergoes cost and time overruns is also siphoning off vitally required resources away from other defense projects, and ultimately, from the nation’s poor. [5]
Some Indian analysts have speculated that, notwithstanding Singh’s remarks, the decision to postpone the Agni III test was taken to avoid roiling relations with the United States at a time when Singh and President George W. Bush are seeking to gain support from a skeptical U.S. Congress for their March 2, 2006, nuclear agreement. [6] That agreement would end a decades-long embargo on U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India, imposed because of concerns over India’s development of nuclear weapons.
 That agreement also contains provisions to open U.S.-India cooperation in the peaceful uses of space. Testing the Agni III would underscore India’s intention to continue to expand its strategic nuclear capabilities and add to the possible concerns of some U.S. lawmakers that by approving peaceful nuclear and space cooperation with New Delhi, they would also be endorsing the expansion of the Indian nuclear arsenal. The test-launch could also heighten U.S. and international attention to long-standing allegations that India has improperly applied technology from its peaceful, satellite launch program to its military missiles. [7]
India may also have wished to avoid tensions with the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which holds its annual plenary meeting in Brazil from May 29 to June 2. The group must amend its operating rules to permit peaceful nuclear cooperation between its members and India.
One analysis also suggested that India may have been concerned that the test launch of a missile specifically directed at China might have been seen in New Delhi as unnecessarily threatening relations with Beijing at a sensitive time. [8] On May 30, 2006, India and China signed the first-ever memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the defense ministries of the two countries. The memorandum institutionalizes frequent exchanges between officials of the ministries and the armed forces, and provides for developing an annual calendar for joint exercises and training programs. [9] China, it may be noted, has been following Agni III developments closely, with the government-controlled China News Agency tracking past official Indian claims for the system and tentative test announcements. [10]
Speaking to the decision to postpone the Agni III test, Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee, denied such considerations, political pressures from the United States, or worries about the Nuclear Suppliers Group played a role in Prime Minister’s Singh’s decision. In comments to reporters, he stated:
There is no political pressure. As a responsible member of the international community we have certain obligations. Keeping our international commitments and also our commitment for non-proliferation we are taking care of our technological up-gradation on our equipment and our missile programs…. We have no pressure on us. Nor are we putting any political pressure. It is just that we have decided to have self-imposed restraint. [11]
Indian officials, it may be noted, have several times in the past declared the Agni III to be ready for testing, only to postpone the launch date thereafter. [12]
Defense science advisor Natarajan’s open and rather direct challenge to Prime Minister Singh follows equally confrontational comments from the head of India’s nuclear establishment, Anil Kakodkhar, in early February. Kakodkhar serves as Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman and chief of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). During early 2006, the Singh government was deciding what proportion of India’s nuclear program to place under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection pursuant to the Bush-Singh agreement, a step that would make certain Indian nuclear facilities unavailable for potential use in India’s nuclear weapon program. In an interview in the Indian Express, Kakodkhar publicly insisted that India’s advanced “breeder reactor” program be exempted from such restrictions. When asked, “Tomorrow, if a suggestion comes [from the Singh government], ‘Dr Kakodkar as chief of DAE and AEC, please put the breeder program under safeguards,’ you’d have no qualms,” Kakodkar defiantly replied, “No, I will say that this is not in our strategic interest.” [13]
Singh declined to discipline Kakodkhar and ultimately accepted his recommendation on this and other elements of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, greatly reducing its appeal in the United States. Whether Singh will respond in a similar fashion to the pressure from Natarajan is difficult to predict, but the Kakodkhar episode suggests that Singh’s political leverage in addressing sensitive nuclear deterrent policy issues may not be as strong as he might wish.
Leonard S. Spector - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] Vishal Thapar, “Agni-III Raring to Go, Government Not Keen,” CNN-IBN, May 15, 2006, http://www.ibnlive.com/news/agniiii-raring-to-go-govt-not-keen/10452-3.html. [View Article]
[2] Ibid.
[3] “Indian Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Agni-III, Capable of Hitting Targets More Than 4,000 Kilometres Away, Is Technically Ready For Launch,” India Daily, May 14, 2006, http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/8730.asp; Gaurav Kampani, “India Profile: Missile Overview,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Missile/index.html. [View Article]
[4] “Agni-3,” MissileThreat.com, http://www.missilethreat.com/missiles/agni-3_india.html. [View Article]
[5] See Source [1].
[6] Rahul Bedi, “India holds back from test firing Agni III,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 24, 2006; “India: Focus - Us Pressure Halts Missile Test,” AsiaAge, May 16, 2006, accessed at http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.298677336&par=0. [View Article]
[7] See, e.g., Testimony of Gary Milhollin, Before the Committee on Science of the U.S. House of Representatives, June 25, 1998, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/1998/6-25.html [View Article]; Richard Speier, “India’s ICBM – On a “Glide Path” to Trouble,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, February 7, 2006, http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/060207SpeierICBM.pdf. [View Article]
[8] Rahul Bedi, “India holds back from test firing Agni III,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 24, 2006.
[9] Pallavi Aiyar, “India, China MoU on Military Ties,” The Hindu, May 30, 2006.
[10] “India to Test-Fire 3,000-km Agni III Missile, People’s Daily, June 05, 2004, http://english.people.com.cn/200406/05/eng20040605_145395.html [View Article]; “India May Test Agni-III Missile in July,” People’s Daily, June 23, 2004.
[11] “Agni-III launch delay not due to political pressure: Pranab Mukherjee,” OnlyPunjab, http://onlypunjab.com/fullstory2k5-insight-News-status-10-newsID-101057.html [View Article]; “India: Focus - Us Pressure Halts Missile Test,” AsiaAge, May 16, 2006, accessed at http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.298677336&par=0. [View Article]
[12] “Plans Afoot to Test-Fire Agni III This Year,” The Hindu, June 5, 2004, quoting V.K. Aatre, then-Scientific Adviser to the Indian Minister of Defense; http://www.hinduonnet.com/2004/06/05/stories/2004060501841200.htm;
[View Article]
”Agni III -- On and Off,” Vijainder K Thakur website, March 30, 2005, http://kuku.sawf.org/Articles/902.aspx;
[View Article] Gaurav Kampani, “India Profile: Missile Overview,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Missile/index.html. [View Article]
[13] “Interview with Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy.” Indian Express, February 8, 2006, [http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=87466].
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